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RECENT CASES

PHYSICIANS

AND

SURGEONS-DAMAGES-PARENTS

OF

AN

UN-

PLANNED CHILD, IN SUIT FOR WRONGFUL CONCEPTION MAY RECOVER
DAMAGES FOR MEDICAL EXPENSES, PAIN AND SUFFERING, Loss OF CONSORTIUM, AND COSTS OF REARING THE CHILD TO MATURITY.

Following the birth of their seventh child, the plaintiffs consulted
with Dr. Jon Stratte of the Stillwater Clinic in order to insure that no
more children would be born to them. Subsequently, a vasectomy was
performed on Mr. Sherlock. The clinic failed to inform plaintiffs that
the operation was not successful,' and plaintiffs resumed normal
sexual relations. Several months later plaintiffs discovered Mrs. Sherlock was pregnant and in due course she delivered a healthy baby
boy. The plaintiffs brought suit against Stillwater Clinic, 2 claiming
that their eighth child's unplanned birth was a direct result of Dr.
Stratte's3 negligent postoperative care of Mr. Sherlock. The plaintiffs
requested damages for pain and suffering, loss of consortium, medical expenses, and the costs of rearing a normal, healthy baby to maturity.4 The original action, brought in District Court, Washington
County, Minnesota, was submitted to the jury on general negligence
instructions and entered judgment on jury verdict for $19,500. Defendant, Stillwater Clinic appealed. 5
Minn.--,
, 260 N.W.2d 169 (1977). Three
1. Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, weeks after the operation, on January 23, 1971, Mr. Sherlock brought a sample of his
semen to the clinic. Later the same day Dr. Stratte telephoned Mr. Sherlock, told him the
results of the test were "negative" and advised no further testing or further use of contraceptives. In fact, the January 23 test revealed that Mr Sherlock was not yet sterile,
the semen having a sperm density of 5 to 10 sperm cells per high-power microscope fie]l
and that 50% were mobile. Id. at 177.
2. Id. at , 260 N.W.2d at 169. Stillwater Clinic is a partnership. Id.
3. Stillwater Clinic rather than Dr. Stratte was named as the defendant because of
the agency relationship among the partners of Stillwater Clinic. In Minnesota., each partner is the agen.t of the others during the existence of the partnership. Egner v. States
Realty Co., 223 Minn. 305, 26 N.W.2d 464 (1947). A principal is liable for the acts of
an agent within the scope of agency or employment. Kasner v. Gage, 281 Minn. 149, 161
N.W;.2d 40 (1968). Also, in Minnesota, a private or charitable hospital is liable for torts
of Its employees under the respondant superior doctrine. Swigerd v. City of Ortonville,
246 Minn. 339, 75 N.,V.2d 217 (1956).
4. Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, Minn. at , 260 N.W.2d at 171. The lawsuit
was brought as an ordinary negligence action. Id.
5. Id. at -,
260 N.W.2d at 171-72. The defendant challenged the award on the
ground that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict and that the verdict was
contrary to law. Id.
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The Supreme Court of Minnesota ruled that an action for "wrongful conception" may be maintained, and that compensatory damages
may include all prenatal and postnatal medical expenses, the mother's
pain and suffering during pregnancy and delivery, and loss of consortium.6 In addition, the parents may recover the reasonable costs
of rearing the unplanned child subject to offset by the value of the7
child's aid, comfort, and society during the parents' life expectancy.
260 N.W.2d 169 (1977).
Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, -Minn.-,
The uniformly recognized rule, prior to 1967,8 was that irrespective of the issue of liability for performance of an unsuccessful sterilization operation, no damages resulted from the birth of a normal child
through normal delivery.9 Similarly, it appears that no court ever al-

lowed damages for the birth of an abnormal child 0 or an abnormal
delivery prior to 1967.
The reasons given by courts which have refused damages for the

birth of an unplanned child resulting from a physician's negligence are
numerous. In a Pennsylvania case 12 the plaintiff brought an action for
negligence after an ineffective sterilization, and sought damages for
supporting, educating, and maintaining an unplanned child until maturity.1 3 Damages were disallowed, the theory being voiced that to
allow damages for the normal birth of a normal child would be against
public policy since the plaintiff wants the benefit of the fun, joy, and
affection of the child while he expects the physician to support it.14
In addition, a Washington court held that where a vasectomy failed
6. Id. at
, 260 N.W.2d at 170.
7. Id. at -,
260 N.W.2d at 176. Damages are measured by computing the rearing
costs, iLe., the reasonably foreseeable expenses that .will be incurred by the parents to
maintain, support and educa te their child until the aL- of maturity. The trier of fact will
then be required to reduce those costs by the value of the child's aid, comfort and society
which will benefit the parents for the remainder of their lives. The court admitted that
the dollar value of the benefits to be offset would be difficult to determine, but stated
that courts have routinely allowed damages for loss of aid, comfort and society in wrongful death actions where the same problems of proof arise. Id.
Because of errors in the submission of the issue of damages to the jury in that
they were not specifically instructed to offset the value of the child's aid, comfort and
society against projected rearing costs, the case was remanded for new trial limited to
that issue, Id.
8. A Californ.ia court was the first to hold that damages for wrongful conception were
allowable, if proven, for the birth of a normal healthy child. Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal.
A
. 2d 103, 59 Cal. Rntr. 463 (1967).
9. Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W'. 620 (1914)
Gleitman v. Cosgrove,
49 N.J. 22. 227 A.2d 689 (1967) : Shaheen v. Knight. 6 Lyc. 19, 11 Pa. 1). & C. 2d 41
(1957) : Ball v. Mudge, 64 Wash. 2d 247, 391 P.2d 201 (1964)
27 A.L.R.3d 906, 917
(1969).
10. gee Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967). In this negligence action involving a defective child, no damages were allowed to parents of a retarded baby.

Id.
11.
grant
12.
11.
14.

Sec Ball v. Mudae, 64 Wash. 2d 247, 391 P.2d 201 (1964). The court refused
1smqzes when a Caesarean section had to be Performed to save the mother. Id.
Shaheen v. Knight. 6 T.yc. 19. 11 Pa. 1). & C. 2d 41 (1957).
Id. at-,
11 Pa. D. & C. 2d at 41-42.
Id. at, 11 Pa, T. & C. 2d at 45-46.
To allow damages in a suit such as this would mean the physician would
have to pay for the fun. joy and affe-tion which plaintiff Shaheen will have
in rearing and education of this, defendent's fifth child, Many people would
he willing to support this child were they given the right of custody and

to
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to render the plaintiff sterile and negligence was clear since no tests
had been given to determine if the operation was effective, damages
could not be allowed for the birth of an unplanned child. 15 The court
ruled that the benefits. of the child far outweighed any expense con16
nected with his birth.
In a New Jersey case, 17 which concerned a physician's negligence

in failing to inform parents that a child could be defective, the court
stated that in order to determine damages a court would have to
evaluate the denial to them of intangible, unmeasurable, and complex
human benefits of motherhood and fatherhood and weigh them against
the alleged 'emotional and money injuries. 8 The court concluded that
it would be impossible to measure the damages asked when the parents insisted the child should not have been born. 19
In Christensen v. Thornby,'20 the 'husband was supposedly sterilized
by a vasectomy after his wife was advised not to have another child
because of health reasons. Nonetheless the wife became pregnant. 21 ,
The court sustained defendant's demurrer claiming plaintiffs stated
no cause of action since no negligence on the doctor's part was alleged. The court inferred in dicta that damages for expenses due to
the birth of the child would be too remote from the physician's negligence since the purpose of the sterilization was to prevent the mother's
death, not prevent childbirth. 22 In contrast to the other early wrongful
conception cases, the North Dakota Supreme Court 23 recognized a possible cause of injury to the mother for physical pain and suffering dur24
ing childbirth .
adoption, but according to plaintiff's statement, plaintiff does not want such.
He wants to have the child and wants the doctor to support it,.

Id.
15.

Ball v. Mudge, 64 Wash. 2d 247, 391 P.2d 201 (1964,).

16.

Id. at 250, 391 P.2d at 204.
As reasonable persons, the jury may well have concluded that appellants
suffered no damages in the birth of a normal, healthy child, whom they
dearly love, would not consider placing for adoption, and 'would not sell for
$50,000,' and that the cost incidental to such birth was far outweighed by the
blessing of a cherished child, albeit an. unwanted child at the time of conception and birth.

Id.
17. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
18. Id. at , 227 A.2d at 693.
19. Id.
20. 192 Minn. 129, 255 N.W. 620 (1934).
21. Christensen '. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 124, 255 N,. 620, 621 (1934).
22. Id. at 126, 255 N.,V. at 622 (dictum). "The purpose of the operation was to save
the wife from the hazards to her life which were incident to childbirth. It was not the
alleged purpose to save the expense incident to pregnancy and' delivery." Id.
23. Milde v. Leigh, 75 N.D. 418, 28 N.W.2d 530 (1947).
24. Id. at 424, 28 N.W.2d at 534. In the North Dakota case, the plaintiff had brought
an action to recover damages for monies expended for his wife's care and medical expenses and for loss of services and companionship. The plaintiff's wife became pregnant
and gave birth after a physician had agreed to render her sterile. Id. at 431, 28 N.W.2d
at 532.
The court did not rule directly on the question of damages, affirming the ruling of
the lower court which had sustained plaintiff's demurrer to the defense of the statute of
limitations. Id. at 432, 28 N.W.2d at 538.
In considering the case the court recognized an injury could occur from a negligent
sterilization, stating:
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Beginning in 1967, the traditional view that no damages could
result from the birth of an unplanned child was challenged by more
liberal courts. Custodio v. Bauer,25 relying in part upon the North Dakota decision 8 was the first to hold that damages, if proven in a case
27
of wrongful conception, were allowable for a normal healthy child.
The California court ruled that the mental suffering attendant to the
unexpected pregnancy because of complications which may result, the
complications which do result, and the delivery of a child are all foreseeable consequences of the failure of the sterilization operation. 28
In Troppi v. Scarf29 the Michigan Appeals Court expanded the

precedent for granting damages for wrongful conception set by California.2 0 Following the decision in Custodio,3 1 the Michigan court concluded that damages should be assessed as in any other negligence
action. 2 Troppi rejected the traditional public policy argument that

the birth of a healthy baby is always a benefit and never a detriment,
reasoning that millions of people practice birth control, and would not
do so if they felt another child was not a detriment.33
The negligence of the defendant in this case in the performance of the
operation of plaintiffs was an invasion of her rights and any Injury sustained
by her as a result thereof constituted a tort but did not constitute a tort
on the husband. The actionable wrong against the plaintiff was the interference with his marital rights, depriving him of his wife's services, society
and companionship, and requiring exnenditures by him for her medical treatment and care. These do not constitute mere items of damages in an action
for negligence; they are essential to the cause of action itself, which cannot
arise until such consequences have followed the injury.
Id. at 431, 28 N.W.2d at 532.
25. 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967).
26. The California court interpreted the North Dakota case to Imply "that the husband
on proof of any of the theories of breach of duty on the part of defendants should recover any extraordinary, if not all, of the medical expenses attendant to his wife's confinement and as well the expenses of a sterilization operation." Custodio v. Baier, 251
Cal. App. 2d 303,-,
59 Cal. Rptr. 469, 475 (1967).
27. Id. at . 59 Cal. Rptr. at 477. The action was a result of the negligence of a
physician who failed to sterilize the mother of nine children and asked damages for mental and physicial suffering, medical expenses and costs of raising the child to maturity.
Id. at , 59 Cal. Rptr. at 46C-67.
In making the decision the California court was careful to explain that "the com,but
to replenish the family
pensation was not for the so-called unwanted child ......
exchequer to that . . . [an extra child would not deprive the rest of the family of what
had been planned as their share of the family income.] Id. at -,
59 Cal. Rptr. at 477
28. Id. at , 59 Cal. Rptr. at 476. In California, the general test of foreseeability
of the act Is use. to determine whether an independent intervening act, which actively
operates to produce an injury, breaks the chain of causation. Gill v. Epstein, 62 Cal. 2d
611, 401 P.2d 397, 44 Cal. Tptr. 45 (1965). The court in Custodio found' it difficult to
conceive how the very act, the birth of a child, the consequences of which the operation
was designed to forestall, could be considered unforeseeable. Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal
App. 2d at -,
59 Cal. Rptr. at 472.
29. 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.11'.2d 511 (1967). The case involved a negligence action
by a plaintiff against a nharmacst. The olaint'ff conceived after the defendant negligently dispened tranquilizers instead of birth control pills. Id. at 243, 187 N.AV.2d at 512
0. Id. at 240, 187 N.W.2d at 511.
31 . Id. at
, 187 N.W.2d at 516.
32. Id.
33. Id. at
. 187 N.WV.2d at 517. The Michigan court answered the traditional arguments that a child c-ild never be a detriment by stating the following:
Contraceptives are used to prevent the birth of healthy children. To say
that for reasons of public policy contraceptive failure can result In no damage as a matter of law ignores the fact that tens of millions of persons use
contraceptives daily to avoid the very result which the defendant would have

RECENT

CASES

However, the Michigan court allowed for the mitigation of damages by the value of the child to the parents, adopting the special
benefit rule from the Restatement, Torts Section 920 (1939).34 Although the court rejected the idea that benefits would always outweigh any damages, it did feel that benefits should vary with the circumstances in each case.A
The holding in Troppi represents the majority rule, which has been

followed almost to the letter in similar cases by California, 36 Connecticut, 37 New Jersey 3 8 and Ohio.39 The majority rule has allowed damages of four basic types, 40 including damages for costs of rearing the
unplanned child,4 1 less the value of any special benefit to be derived
us say Is always a benefit, and never a detriment. Those tens of millions of
persons, by their conduct, express the sense of the community.
Id.
34. Id. at -,
187 N.W.2d at 517-18; See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 920 (1939), which
states the following: "Where the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the
plaintiff or to his property and in so doing has conferred upon the plaintiff a special
benefit to the interest which was harmed, the value of the benefit conferred is considered
In mitigation of damages, where this is equitable." Id.
35. Troppl v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. at , 187 N.W.2d at 519. The Michigan appellate
court reasoned that the trier of fact must have the power to evaluate the benefit accordIng to all circumstances of the case presented. Family size, family income, age of parents
and marital status of parents are some but not all of the factors to be considered In determining the extent to which the birth of a child represents a benefit to his parents. Id.
Troppi also answered the traditional argument that the parents should either give
up the child for adoption, get an abortion or pay for the child's upbringing themselves.
Applying the tort principle that a tortfeasor takes his victim as he finds him, the court
stated that a defendant does not have the right to demand that the victim of his neg!igence have the emotional and mental makeup of a woman, who is willing to abort or
place a child for adoption. Because a negligent tortfeasor takes his victim as he finds
him, he cannot complain that the damages that will be assessed against him are greater
because his negligence resulted in the conception of a child by a woman whose emotional
and mental makeup Is inconsistent with aborting or placing a child for adoption than If
the victim of his negligence had been a woman who could do so. Id. at , 187 N.W.2d
at 520.
The Ohio court In Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 356 N.E.2d 496 (1976), reJected the arguments of courts which had claimed damages for unplanned children would
be against public policy. Raising a constitutional issue, the Ohio court reasoned that to
enforce a policy that makes physicians liable for the foreseeable consequences of all negligently performed operations except those Involving sterilizations would be a violation, of a
fundamental ffight, the right not to procreate. Id. at 135-36, 356 N.E.2d at 499. See generally Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) ; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) ; Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
36. Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976).
37. Anonymous v. Hospital, 33 Conn. Supp. 125, 366 A.2d 204 (1976).
38. Betancourt v. Gaylor, 136 N.J. Super. 69, 344 A.2d 336 (1975).
39. Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 356 N.E.2d 496 (1976).
40. Id. at , 356 N.E.2d at 497. The Ohio Supreme Court allowed a $450,000 jury
verdict for damages connected with the birth of an unplanned child plus $12,500 for loss
of consortium and cited the following as four basic types of damage: (1)
expenses stemming from foreseeable consequences of the operation; (2)
the value of the mother's society, comfort, care and protection lost to other members of the family; (3) expenses due
to the change in the family stat's,
including extra money to compensate for the fact
that the mother must spread her society, comfort, care and protection over a larger group
and extra money to replenish the family exchequer so that the new arrival will not deprive other members of the family of their planned share; and, (4)
economic costs of
rearing the child. Id.
41. California, Connecticut, Michigan, New Jersey and Ohio allow damages for pain
and suffering, loss of consortium, medical expenses and costs of rearing the unplanned
child. See Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. Id 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976) ; Anonymous
v. Hospital, 33 Conn. Supn. 126, 366 A.2d 204 (1975) ; Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App.
240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971) : Betancourt v. Gaylor, 136 N.J. Super 69, 344 A.2d 336
(1975) ; Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 956 N E.2d 496 (1976).
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from the birth of the child. 42 The action for wrongful conception damages due to a doctor's negligence in performing a sterilization pro43
cedure has been recognized as a traditional negligence action.
Two states, Texas, 44 and Wisconsin, 45 follow the present minority
rule. In refusing to award damages for wrongful conception, the Texas

court followed the theory that although raising a child may not be
profitable from an economic point of view, the intangible benefits of a
normal healthy child make any economic loss worthwhile.4 6 Wisconsin
followed the alternative theory, ruling that granting damages for the
4
birth of a healthy child would be violative of public policy. 7
A number of the early cases which rejected damages and the
present minority courts are very much concerned with the adverse
effect on the child in question when he someday learns his parents
sued their family doctor because he was born.48 While the child may
benefit financially from a recovery by his parents, resultant psychological or emotional harm may far outweigh any pecuniary benefit.
The claim by the child's parents may have the effect of making him
an "emotional bastard," when he learns of his parents' suit, the very
42. See supra note 34. The benefit test has been adopted
by several jurisdictions.
Custodio v,. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967); Troppi v. Scarf, 31
Mich. App. 240, 187 N.NV.2d 511 (1971); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, Minn.,
260 N.W.2d 169 (1977). See Anonymous v. Hospital, 33 Conn. Supp. 126, 366 A.2d 204
(1975); Betancourt v. Gaylor, 136 N.J. Super. 69, 344 A.2d 336 (1975); Bowman v.
Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 356 N.E.2d 496 (1976).
43. See Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. at , 187 N.W.2d at 516; Bowman v. Davis,
48 Ohio St. 2d at , 356 N.E.2d at 499.. The physician's negligence in each case is
the proximate cause of birth of the child, and the birth of the child, costs the family the
expense of childbirth and rearing as well as medical expenses, loss of consortium, and
pain and suffering during pregnancy. Id.
44. LaPoint v. Shirley, 409 F. Supp. 118 (W.D. Tex. 1976) ; Terrell v. Garcia, 496
S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
45. Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.,V.2d 242 (1974).
46. Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d at 128.
Who can place a price tag on a chill's smile or the parental pride in a chills
achievement? Even If we considerel only the economic point of view, a child
Is some security for the parents' old age. Rather than attempt to value these
Intangible benefits, our courts have simply determined that public sentiment
recognizes that these benefits to the parents outweigh their economic loss
in rearing and educating a healthy, normal child.
Id.
47. Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d at 518-19, 219 N.W.2d at 245. An action for damages for a child born after an Ineffective sterilization procedure was rejected
for public policy reasons on the following grounds: (1)
the resulting damages would be
wholly out of proportion to the culpability involved; (2)
allowing recovery would place
an unreasonable burden upon physicians; (3)
a cause of action for wrongful conception
would open the way for fraudulent claims: (4)
a field of damages would be opened thai
has no just or sensible stopping point: and, (5)
the parents seek to retain the child and
all benefits while seekine to transfer only the financial costs of its upbringing to the doctor. Id. at 519, 219 N.W.2d at 244.
Delaware borrowed points from both the minority view and the majority view In
Coleman v, Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975). That case allowed damaEes for pain and
discomfort of pregnancy, medical expenses, loss of consortium and for the cost of a tubal
ligation, but refused to grant any' damaees for rearing the unplanned child. The court
felt that the value of human life would nutweigh any posslble fut're costs. In addition
the court felt It woold violate nobife policy since the child could be Iniured emotionally
by knowledge of the circtlmstance of the lawsuit stemming from his birth. Id.
48. See Coleman v. Garrison. 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975) : Shaheen v. Knight, 6 Lye. 19,
11 Pa. D. & C. 2d 41 (1957) : Rieck v. Medipal Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514. 219 N.W.2d
242 (1974).
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essence of which is that the child is a continuing burden and the product of a doctor's misfeasance rather than his parents' wishes.4"
In Sherlock the Minnesota Supreme Court followed the majority
rule closely. However, in doing so, the court overruled what other
state courts" had considered to be the rule in Minnesota. 5 1 In making
its decision the Minnesota court contrasted the action for wrongful
conception brought in Sherlock from an action for "wrongful birth" or
"wrongful life" which asks the jury to measure damages on relative
merits of being versus non-being.52 The action for wrongful conception
is exclusively that of the parents, since it is they, not the child, who
suffers the injury.5 3 In addition, the court felt that the emotional
shock to the child whose birth is the subject of the lawsuit would be
no greater than the distress felt by any child who finds that his birth
is nothing more than a product of his parents' ineptitude at birth control.54
Using the majority rule, the Sherlock decision recognized that the
expenses of the birth of an unplanned child are a direct financial injury to the parents and that such damages should be recovered in an
ordinary negligence action. The majority in Sherlock also felt that
the failure of the mother to abort or give up the child for adoption
could not be regarded as failure to mitigate damages. 56 The only
variation of the majority rule stated in Sherlock from that stated in
Troppi was that rather than a general jury verdict, Minnesota courts
would use a special verdict with explanatory instructions to prevent
57
excessive damage awards.
49.

9 UTAH L. REV. 808, 811-12 (1965).

50. Shaheen v. Knight, 6 Lyc. 19, 11 Pa. D. & C. 2d 41 (1957); Terrell v. Garcia, 496
S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973); Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219
N.W.2d 242 (1974).
51. Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn.. 123, 255 NW. 620 (1934). In deciding a question of whether a cause of action existed, the court's dictum was interpreted to be the
rule in Minnesota by other courts:
[Tihe plaintiff has been blessed with the fatherhood of another child. The
expenses alleged are incident to the hearing of a child, and their avoidance
is remote from the avowed purpose of the operation. As well might the plain.
tiff cha ge defendant with the cost of nurture and education of the child
during minority.
Id. at 126, 255 N.W.at 622 (dictum).
The majority in Sherloek explained Its decision by stating that the former rule,
which was in fact merely cictum, stood only for the proposition that a cause of action
exists for an improperly performed sterilization, since the issue of damages was neither
raised nor directly considered in that earlier case. Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic,
Minn..at
, 260 N.XV.2d at 172-73.
52. Id. at
, 260 N.W. at 172. Compare with Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Il. Anp. 2d 204,
190 N.E.2d 849 (1963): Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967); Dumer
v. St. Michael's Hospital, 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975)
(examples of "wrongful
birth" cases).
53. Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, -Minn*.
at , 260 N.W.2d at 175.
54. Id. at , 260 N.W.2d at 173, citing Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59
Cal. Rntr. 463 (1967).
55. Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, -.
%inn. at , 260 N.W.2d at 175.
56. Id. at , 260 N.WV.2d at 176. See su)ra notes 34 and 35.
57. Id. Chief Justice Sheran, joined by Justice Peterson dissented. The dissent In Sherlock followed the minority theory that the worth of a healthy baby to his parents will
always exceed the costs associated with birth and rearing. Id. at -,
260 N.W.2d at 177
(Sheran, C. J.., Peterson, J., dissenting).

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

Minnesota's decision in Sherlock is a well reasoned decision in a
situation with intense emotional and ethical problems for both the
courts and the litigants. These same legal versus moral-ethical problems would also arise in North Dakota should a case similar to Sher-lock arise. If the present North Dakota Supreme Court should interpret its decision in Milde v. Leigh,5 the same way the California59 and
Michigan-0 courts have, then at least damages for pain and suffering,
medical expenses, and loss of consortium could be recovered for the
birth of an unplanned child due to a physician's negligence. The Minnesota court decision in Sherlock, joining with the majority which includes California could also influence the North Dakota court should
an action seeking damages for rearing an unplanned child arise. On
the other hand, a state whose electorate twice turned down liberalized
abortion laws could well refuse damages for rearing an unwanted
child on the grounds that such an award would be violative of public
policy.

GORDON

58.
59.
60.

NMilde v. Leigh, 75 N.D. 418, 28 N.NV.2d 530 (1947).
Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967).
Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971).

DIHLE

